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A Cruel Trilemma: The Flawed
Political Economy of Remedies to WTO
Subsidies Disputes
ABSTRACT

This Note examines the effectiveness of the World Trade
Organization at remedying disputes involving trade subsidies.
The WTO as created in the Uruguay Round was the first
multilateral trade institution that included prohibitionsagainst
trade subsidies of a more-than-aspirationalnature that were
agreed to by most states in the world community. The WTO was
thus envisioned as ushering in an era where subsidies had
significantly less detrimental effects on the international
economic community.
This Note seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of the WTO's
subsidy provisions through analyses of decisions in early WTO
jurisprudence. These decisions will be evaluated, in part,
through recourse to economic and public choice theories. Ideally,
remedies to government-granted subsidies should attempt to
cure the sort of underlying rent-seeking behavior that causes
subsidies without fostering the coalescence of anti-WTO
constituencies that over the long term could meaningfully
undermine principles of free trade. Following this discussion,
several proposals for WTO reform will be evaluated in the light
of this Note's underlying analysis.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Note is intended to do two things. Foremost, it is intended
to discuss remedies the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
imposed in the first three disputes it has decided involving subsidies.
It will also attempt to show, through recourse to economic and public
choice theory, whether the remedy imposed caused the country to
comply, and finally, why the remedy was or was not effective.
The prime goal of international trade law needs to be the
avoidance of a "protectionist summum malum".1 Such a situation
would occur where domestic or social pressures in a particular
country lead a state to increase or reinstate barriers to trade, thus
triggering a reaction in other states that would end in a so-called
"race to the bottom" leading to global economic disaster. 2 This Note,
through an examination of WTO case law, concludes that the WTO
has found no truly effective, theoretically justifiable way to remedy
disputes involving subsidies and that the ways it has found are either

1.
From the Latin, "the sum of all bads," e.g., the worst-case scenario. Robert
Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral
Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 94 (2002) (emphases in the original).
2.
Id. at 94-95.
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ineffective or run the risk of being counterproductive in the longterm. All things considered, this is not surprising: subsidies
endemically are difficult to deter, and this difficulty is compounded by
trying to do this in a supranational context where governments bring
conflicting agendas to negotiations promising comprehensive
solutions.
Prior to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, commentators stated
that one of the major problems plaguing the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) did not deal effectively with subsidies. 3
Since the ratification of the WTO Agreement containing
improvements to the GATT, this relative ineffectiveness has
continued: subsidy cases have been among the most difficult to
remedy. 4 When the WTO Agreement was signed in Marrakesh in
1994, its dispute settlement procedures were thought of as a "decisive
improvement" over the procedures codified and practiced under the
GATT. 5 Of the first 185 disputes that came before the WTO, only
twenty-six reached the points where the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes apply.6 "In fourteen
of those, the offending member either fully implemented or agreed to
implement in a manner acceptable to the winning party. '7 Six of the
disputes led to non-compliance procedures, and six more are still
either awaiting implementation or the establishment or expiration of
their reasonable period to implement. 8 These procedures have been
less effective regarding subsidies than with other issues: Three of
these initial six are the basis of much of this Note. In addition, a
"later" case, United States-Foreign Sales Corporations, will be
discussed in detail.9 This Note will attempt to explain why these
disputes have been harder to remedy.

3.
The Marrakesh Declaration, announcing the end of the Uruguay Round of
negotiations, sought to strengthen the world economy and increase income through
"operating in a fair[er]" system where Members would not undertake measures that
would "undermine or adversely affect the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations or
their implementation." See Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, Declaration Section,
1-2, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS.

4.

See Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement

System Implementation Procedures:A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 709, 709-13 (2000).

5.
6.

Id. at 709.
Id. at 709-10.

7.

Id. at 710

8.
Id. at 710-11.
9.
Australia-LeatherGoods and Brazil-Export FinancingProgram for Aircraft
and Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, will be discussed in
Section III of this Note. United States-Foreign Sales Corporations will be also be
discussed though it is described as a "later" case because the original dispute
underlying it is currently more than twenty years old.

590

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37587

The structure of this Note is as follows: Section II generally
outline the WTO system and discusses the basic history of the
regulation of subsidies under the world trading system. Section III of
this Note will attempt to outline a number of reasons why the two
sections of the WTO Agreement that regulate subsidies are
problematic to remedy. It will then seek to evaluate various proposals
for reform of the WTO Agreement in light of the discussion included
in this Note.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The General WTO Framework'
The WTO provides the institutional and legal foundation for the
multilateral trading system that came into being on January 1,
1995.11 It has become the major international body that deals with
the rules of trade between nations. 12 The agreement that founded it
and set out its role, structure, and powers, was also the first text in
the package of Uruguay Round agreements signed in Marrakesh on
April 15, 1994.13
These documents are basically contracts between countries that
are intended to help facilitate private trade amongst them. 14 With the
Marrakesh Declaration, the Ministers of the Member States of the
WTO declared the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations formally
concluded. 15 In the Uruguay Round, the Ministers believed that they
had provided a "stronger and clearer legal framework . . . for the

conduct of international trade, with a more effective and reliable
dispute settlement mechanism," that would result in a forty percent
16
reduction of tariffs and wider market-opening agreements on goods.
The Ministers believed "that the trade liberalization and
strengthened rules achieved in the Uruguay Round would lead to a
progressively more open trading environment" which would lead

10.
In the course of this Note, "WTO" will be used with both of its traditional
two meanings: it stands for both the WTO Agreements and the organization
established by them.
11.
The WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 1
[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS].

12.

WTO, TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 3 (2d ed. 2001).

13.
14.

GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 11, at 1.
TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 3.

15.

Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994, contained in THE LEGAL TEXTS:

THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, supra

note 3, at iii-v.
16.
Id. at iii.
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toward a more balanced and integrated global trade partnership. 17 As
part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the Member States of the
WTO adopted a number of agreements that went far beyond the scope
of the GATT that had been adopted in 1947.18 The Agreement sought
to perform a number of functions, among them to achieve greater
coherence of trade policy with respect to agriculture, textiles and
clothing, banking, telecommunications, government purchases,
industrial sanitation, food sanitation regulation, and intellectual
property.19
The WTO Agreements are enforced through a WTO-specific
dispute settlement system. 20 This system is outlined in the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU).2 1 The judicial portions of the DSU consists of three,
or possibly five, member Dispute Settlement Panels (Panels) and a
standing Appellate Body. 22 To gain legal status, both the Board and
Panel reports are referred to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of
the WTO, in which only a unanimous vote by all Members can stop
such reports from becoming law.23 Thus, the dispute resolution
process in the WTO is in a sense automatic because rarely if ever will
the "winning party" vote against having the remedy imposed.2 4 In the
event of a breach of the WTO rules, the DSB recommends that the
Member concerned bring the breach into conformity with the WTO
Agreement that has been violated.2 5 Typically, "withdrawal" of the
measure is required. 26 "In addition, both the Panel and the Appellate

17.
Id. at iv.
18.
GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, supra note 12, at 1-2. The
GATT, a provisional agreement that governed international trade from 1948-1994, had
been originally conceived as lasting only long enough until an organization called the
International Trade Organization (ITO), in many respects similar to the WTO, could
come into being. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 9.
19.
TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 5.
20.
It has been postulated that the DSU Agreement resulted from the
entrustment of trade law to a specialized policy elite insulated from the political
system. Howse, supra note 1, at 98. This group of experts were neither particularly
interested in, or sympathetic to, larger political struggles going on in the world, or to
those that had resulted in the creation of the GATT-system itself. Id. As many of them
were grounded in disciplines such as policy studies and economics, they were hesitant
to allow the trading system to develop along the lines of a politically-driven body like
the United Nations. Id.
website
at
through
the
WTO
DSU
is
available
21.
The
http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/dsu.htm. It can also be found in THE LEGAL TEXTS,
supra note 3, at 354.
22.
See DSU art. 6.1. Members of the WTO, under Art. 23.1 of the DSU,
recognize that the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system is compulsory
and exclusive as far go violations of WTO rules. Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are
Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 336 (2000).
Id. (discussing DSU Art. 19.1).
25.
Id.
26.
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Body may suggest methods in which the Member concerned could
implement the recommendations. ' 27 Prompt compliance with the
28
recommendations and the rulings of the DSB is explicitly dictated.
If it is impracticable to comply immediately Members are to be given
reasonable periods of time to comply.2 9 These are determined either
through agreement or through binding arbitration. 30 If compliance is
still not achieved, countermeasures are awarded to all WTO
members. 3 1 These countermeasures entail the winning party raising
trade barriers vis-A-vis the losing party, a move which is detrimental
to free trade principles. 32 The "constitutional" case law of the WTO
has deepened of late through disputes involving the United States
and EU over bananas, 33 hormone-treated beef, 34 and regarding their
disputes over U.S. tax structures, such that parties now are fully
35
aware of procedures under the WTO.
B. An Introduction to the SCM and Its Role in the WTO System
GATT 1947 allowed countries to use export subsidies on
agricultural primary products, though it prohibited them in
situations on industrial products. 36 The GATT prohibited export
subsidies only when the result was an export price lower than
comparable domestic price; the Subsidies Code, Reporters' Note 1,
prohibited export subsidies without regard to differential effects on
prices. 37 Neither the GATT nor the Subsidies Code accompanying it

27.
Id.
28.
Id. (discussing DSU Art. 21.1).
29.
Id. at 337 (discussing DSU Art. 21.3).
30.
Pauwelyn, supra note 24, at 337.
31.
Id. (discussing WTO Art. 22.1).
32.
Id.
33.
See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU,WT/DS27/ARB, Apr. 9, 1999,
6.3.
34.
See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the United
States-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of

the DSU, WTIDS26/ARB, 12 July 1999.
35.

Report of the Appellate Body, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the

European Communities,
United States-Tax
Corporations,"Jan. 14, 2002, WTJDS108/AB/RW.
36.

Treatment

for

"Foreign Sales

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 806 cmt. b (1987).
37.
Id. The GATT (Article 6) allowed countries to take action against other
countries for dumping, which, though similar and often discussed in tandem with
subsidization, is not the same thing. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 29.
In the original GATT framework, subsidies were only required to be reported, thus
acknowledging their role in contributing to inefficiencies in international trade.
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prohibited domestic or production subsidies, though the Code
recognized that such subsidies could cause or threaten injuries in
other states. 38 The Code then admonished parties to "seek to avoid
causing such effects. '39 As the failure to establish the International
Trade Organization (ITO) in part resulted from fear current at the
time of negotiation on the part of constituent nations of giving up
such powers, the prospect was not good of finding success in the
uphill charge necessary to get a coherent and strong agreement on
40
subsidies at that time.
One of the major priorities of parties entering into the Uruguay
Round was to achieve a coherent remedy to subsidy disputes. 4 1 The
resulting Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 42 is
simultaneously one among many of the agreements achieved in the
Uruguay Round, but functionally somewhat different in practice and
43
application from most of the other agreements involved in it.
Subsidies, thus, give rise to responses by the WTO at the behest of
either a Member, where the dumping or subsidized exports end up, or
through action brought by a country who has constituent industries

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
art. XVI.
38.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 806 cmt. b.

39.
Id.
Originally, it was thought that that the GATT would become part of the
40.
ITO. SALVATORE, infra note 61, at 280. "The proposed ITO was ambitious undertaking,
covering not only trade, but employment, commodity agreements, economic
development, and restrictive business practices." David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal
System, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 444, 453 (2000). The ITO, perhaps because it was too
ambitious proposal for the times, was unable to achieve ratification by the U.S. Senate
and other nations. SALVATORE, infra note 61, at 280. Thus, the GATT, originally
envisioned as a stand-in, had to function as the prime unit. Id. The Uruguay Round,
beginning in September 1986, was scheduled to be completed by December 1990, but
disagreements over agricultural subsidies caused the agreement to be delayed three
additional years. Id. at 284. Thus, the Agreements on Agriculture and the SCM
Agreement stop far short of where they may have. The Agreement on Agriculture is
structurally weak in much the same fashion as is the SCM. The Agriculture Agreement
also aims to promote market access and predictability by limiting the amount of
domestic handouts by governments such as price supports on agricultural commodities,
etc. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 17. This is accomplished through
forcing parties to use tariffs as opposed to less economically efficient and visible
previous methods. Id. However, these agreements came with a cost: the Agreement,
though implemented in 1995, did not come into full effect for six to ten years
(depending on whether a country was developed) and even then with a "peace"
provision that was intended to reduce the likelihood of challenges for an additional
nine years. Id.
41.
Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT's Uruguay
Round, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1201-03 (1995) (discussing nations' bargaining
positions regarding subsidies in the Uruguay Round).
42.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
43.
See discussion supra note 11. The Agriculture Agreement is functionally
similar to the SCM in that it deals not with a barrier, but with behavior that is bad for
its market-skewing outcomes.
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who are effected by a loss of sales. 44 Typically, however, this second
action is the cause: actions are triggered by the initiation, through a
written application, of a domestic industry for an investigation of
subsidization. 4 5 The goal of such application is to achieve the
imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing measures on the
relevant imported goods, so as to offset the dumping or subsidy. 4s In
principle, the WTO Agreements themselves outline how such an
investigation would take place, with the intent to insure that the
countervailing measures do not themselves cause material effects
harmful to the interests of the world trading system. 47 Because of the
existence of, and fairly constant recourse to, the use of
"countervailing measures" the SCM differs in a second major respect
to the rest of the WTO Agreements. This is compounded by the more
48
diffuse problems that the SCM Agreement seeks to solve.
The WTO Agreements are intended to settled trade disputes
between parties and to promote principles of free trade. 49 Members of
the WTO agree to use the multilateral mechanism instead of taking
unilateral action upon encountering a trade conflict. 50 There is great
emphasis in the process in getting parties to settle without having
judgment thrust upon them through the full DSU process. 51 A dispute
arises when a Member nation takes an action that one or more
Members believe to be in violation of the WTO Agreements. 52 Unlike

44.
QURESHI, infra note 84, at 273; see also discussion supra note 40
(discussing how subsidies functionally lower costs for consumers at the expense of the
exporting nation).
45.
QURESHI, infra note 84. In the cases discussed in Section III of this Note,
all of the actions were triggered by the second method. Though it is theoretically
possible that an investigation would be triggered by a consumer complaint, it is
unlikely. There is a constant tension between having a useful and functional SCM law,
and fostering market protectionism on the part of "losing" industries. See William K.
Wilcox, GATT-Based Protectionism and the Definition of a Subsidy, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J.
129, 162-63 (1998).
46.
QURESHI, infra note 84, at 273.
47.
Id.
48.
A danger posed by the SCM Agreement, with its allowances of national
'countervailing measures' is that this sort of self-help seems to undercut the legitimacy
of the WTO. It is somewhat logically inconsistent to allow parties to help themselves
under the SCM Agreement but not to allow them in other areas. In regard to trade
issues, self-help, as countries have historically realized does not work: it allows
countries' protectionist impulses to come through. See generally TRADING INTO THE
FUTURE, supra note 12, at 8 ("One of the objectives of the WTO is to prevent a selfdestructive and defeating slide into protectionism.").
49.
TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supranote 12, at 38.
50.
Id. Indeed, as the United States discovered in EU-Bananas, the system has
historically not looked kindly upon those who engage in self-help.
51.
Indeed, by March 2001, 38 of the 228 trade disputes that came before the
WTO settled without going through the full panel process. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE,
supra note 12, at 38-39.
52.
Id.
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under the GATT regime, fixed timetables exist, and an orderly
53
process allows disputes to achieve resolution in a timely manner.
Conflicts pass through phases of consultation, through a Dispute
Settlement Board (Board), and then, if the parties disagree as to how
the law was applied, the rulings of that Board can be appealed. 54 The
intent of agreeing to procedures specifying how disputes are to be
settled is to avoid destructive trade wars.
Regarding dispute settlement, a second major change from
dispute process under the GATT is although the final DSB and
Appellate Rulings have to be adopted by vote of the membership, the
"losing" party is no longer able to stop this from happening. 55 WTO
jurisprudence is thus evolving at a rapid rate. With this occurring,
and because of the novelty of the concept dealt with under the SCM
Agreement, 56 in the disputes that have arisen under it, Appellate
Boards have taken a number of different approaches to solving the
problem, none of them completely satisfactory.

III.

THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIES AND REMEDIES IMPOSED BY THE
WTO APPELLATE BODY IN EARLY CASES

During the Uruguay Round negotiations related to subsidies,
negotiators had to balance three interrelated considerations.5 7 First,
countries needed to counteract unfair trade practices; second, they
needed to find a way to keep parties from using measures aimed at
ending unfair practices from being used to block "fair" trade; and
third, the WTO needed to find a way to give some of its members a
level of deference to avoid trampling their sovereignty. 58 This Note
will argue either through the drafting of the SCM, or because of the
nature of subsidies, these criteria are impossible to balance, and as
such, any attempt at doing so would cause relatively uncertain law.
One must be traded at the expense of the others: at least if the cases
thus far are any indication.
Steve Charnovitz, in an essay investigating WTO trade
sanctions, posed a number of questions necessary to appraise the

53.
Id. If a case runs the full course that the WTO provides-proceeding
through the DSB through an appeals phase-the proceedings should not take more
than 15 months. Id.
54.
Id. at 39.
55.
Id. at 38-39.
56.
Many of the problems identified with the SCM Agreement are also
applicable to the Agreement on Agriculture.
57.
Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert T.C. Vermylen, The WTO Antidumping and
Subsidies Agreements: Did the United States Achieve Its Objectives Duringthe Uruguay
Round, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 871, 871-72 (2000).

58.

Id.
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application of remedies in particular cases. 59 "Are [the involved]
sanctions effective? Do they strengthen the WTO or weaken it? What
is the impact of sanctions on target and sender nations? How do
sanctions affect international law outside of the WTO? ' 60 These
questions allow for the effects of sanctions in particular instances to
be weighed against their effects on the larger international system.
The remainder of this Note will examine the involved sanctions
applied in challenges brought under the SCM through these two
perceptual lenses.
A. Subsidies Are Different Than Other Trade "Barriers"
It is appropriate at the outset to inquire into the nature of trade
subsidies. Historically, tariffs were the most important kind of trade
barrier. 6 1 Tariffs are visible to harmed parties. 62 They are, however,
not the only kind of barrier: quotas, voluntary export restraints, and
63
regulatory barriers also can function to keep goods out of countries.
The WTO, in regard to these kinds of restrictions, has been relatively
effective, at least numerically, at settling disputes. 64 For these kinds
65
of restrictions, both importing and exporting countries suffer.

Subsidies are different than tariffs. Governments subsidize
industries for numerous reasons, and governments that choose to
subsidize have to choose not to put money spent on subsidies to other
uses. For instance, subsidies are offered to firms to try to forestall
unfavorable business trends (for example, U.S. subsidies to its
domestic steel industry) and to remedy market imperfections (for

59.
Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792,
808 (2001).
60.
Id.
61.
DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 257 (6th ed. 1998).
62.
For instance, a party having to pay a tariff on steel it is trying to import
into the United States would clearly know that the government is using a tariff to keep
its goods out. They would have to pay a certain amount of money before the good would
be allowed into the United States. In the case of a subsidy, a more detailed analysis is
required before a party a) knows that subsidization is going on, and b) can determine
whether such subsidization is legal or illegal.
63.
See id. (stating that a quota is a direct quantitative restriction on the
amount of a commodity allowed to be imported or exported) (emphasis added); id. at
260 (stating that voluntary export restrictions occur when an importing nation induces
an exporting nation to reduce its exports voluntarily); id. at 263 (stating that
regulatory barriers include, for example safety regulations for automobiles, health
regulations for the packaging and production of food products, and labeling
requirements showing origin and contents).
64.
See Gleason & Walther, supra note 4, discussing relative settlement rate
for different kinds of disputes.
65.
See generally SALVATORE, supra note 61, at 227 (discussing effects on
producer and consumer of tariffs). This analysis would largely also largely hold true for
quotas and regulatory restrictions.
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example, vocational retraining programs to help underemployed
66
workers shift from one sector of the economy to a different one).
This utility requires the WTO to apply varying requirements to
different types of subsidy. Countries believe that it can be useful to
promote their economic development, though, the extent to which
countries can succeed in doing so where another country is also
subsidizing is somewhat dubious. Given their utility, the problem
with having any strong prohibition on subsidies is that it causes a
direct interference with a government's abilities to promote
development inside of its borders in so far as they are legal unless
precise definitions can be found to differentiate appropriate from
inappropriate conduct. Prohibitions also dramatically fix the methods
to which countries may act: whether something is a prohibited
subsidy, or a legitimate action, hinges on characterization rather
67
than substance if this is not properly done.
Subsidies arguably are also economically more complex creatures
than the other items prohibited in the WTO Agreements. 68 The
reason that the SCM stops short of a flat prohibition is that subsidies,
in many situations, are tremendously useful. 69 They also necessarily

66.
MIRoSLAv N. JOVANoVI6, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 29
(1998); see also KRUGMAN, infra note 69, at 8-14.
67.
See Spradlin, supra note 41, at 1198-99 (stating that the U.S.'s industrial
policy involving its defense industry has the same practical effect of European
subsidization of their aircraft industry); see also Trade and Competitiveness of U.S.
Industry: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 63
(1992) (Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan stated that "[i]f [anyone] wants to know
whether we should have an industrial policy, in the name of God for the last 45 years,
we have had the most explicit industrial policy in the world. And that is the Cold
War.").
68.
Subsidies are actually trade stimulators. Id. at 266 ("[S]ubsidies lead to
huge . . . surpluses and subsidized exports.") Additionally, "strategic" trade policy
states that, in fields subject to certain parameters, countries can use subsidies to gain
comparative advantage, partially through investing in the development of goods that
would not exist sans subsidy. Id. at 273-75. See Wilcox, supra note 45, at 131-32
("[Strategic] trade theory characterizes the traditional view as simplistic and overly
reliant on models based on false assumptions.").
69.
Valid arguments exist that all subsidies do not pose a problem. Historically,
subsidies were viewed as something useful in enhancing national wealth and power.
Alexander Hamilton believed that American growth and development were contingent
on having a diverse economy; creation of such an economy would necessitate the use of
different forms of subsidization. See WILLIAM R. NESTER, A SHORT HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 2-3 (1998). These policies have continued. For instance,
the Clinton Administration in the U.S. saw valid reasons for "partnerships" between
government and industry as regards technological development issues. See Michael L.
Doane, Green Light Subsidies: Technology Policy in InternationalTrade, 21 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 155, 163-70 (1995). The European giant Airbus exists in testament
to the power of government subsidization of particular industries. See generally Daniel
I. Fisher, Note, "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for the
Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 867 (2002) ("Airbus was designed
by ...governments to play such a dominant role.... With government commitment to
full employment, policymakers view the thousands of jobs Airbus creates . . .as well
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lower prices of goods in importing countries: many underdeveloped
countries benefit from lower prices or goods that developed countries

subsidize.

70

Subsidies are "barriers" because they fundamentally skew the
market from its neoclassical equilibrium. Intervention of political
actors causes prices and production to shift away from where they
would naturally be. Developmental economists have long believed
trade to be an instrument of growth. According to traditional trade
theory, if each nation specializes in the production of the commodity
of its comparative advantage, world output would be greater, and,,
through trade, all nations would share in the collective gain. 7 1 Given
present development and allocation of resources, the theory of
comparative advantage suggests that developing nations should
continue to specialize in the production and export of raw materials,
fuels, minerals and food in exchange for finished products produced
by developed countries. 72 Allowing developed countries-the parties

worth the costs of the support provided."). "Least" developed countries do not have to
make a commitment to reducing tariffs or subsidies. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra
note 12, at 17 (implying that the consensus among nations is that some subsidies serve
a useful purpose). Indeed, some commentators have stated that subsidies are just gifts
from exporting nations to other countries' consumers. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE
FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 45 (1980) ("[Other countries citizens] are the ones that
pay for the subsidies. U.S. consumers benefit. They get cheap TV sets or automobiles.");
Williams, discussed infra, at 242 ("Certain economists and free trade ideologues would
be happy to see our unfair-trade laws gutted. Their view is that if foreign governments
want to subsidize U.S. consumers ...

U.S. law should not interfere ....

Modern trade

theories suggest that under a set of given assumptions, subsidies can add wealth to
both subsidizing, and importing countries. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, STRATEGIC TRADE
POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 8-14 (1986). The major problem with
such "strategic trade" is that it is near impossible ex ante to predict the long-term
consequence of a particular subsidy. SALVATORE, supra note 61, at 277 (stating that
this impossibility in predicting outcomes of a particular subsidy provides the reason
most economists support "fair" trade).
70.
Subsidies result in the exporting country paying the cost of goods bought in
an importing company. Economists and lawyers believe they can be problematic when
they distort trade from what it would be in a perfect world. Those who find subsidies
the most troubling believe that they could be used to establish a "toehold" in a
particular industry to which other countries could not catch up. This point is made
with the supposition that "toehold" subsidies would be difficult to carry out in the real
world. In a competitive industry including multinational companies where there were
instances of rapid technological innovation, it is improbable that the effects of a
subsidy would last much longer than the government would be willing to give them. In
such a scenario, subsidies can be viewed more like factor resources than something
insidious. In reality, when a country chooses to make airplanes (e.g. Bombadier or
Airbus), steel, etc. it does so for a complex set of reasons. It might be attempting to
promote development in a particular industry or section of the country, or it might do it
just for status.
SALVATORE, supra note 61, at 330.
71.
72.
Id. Through their "industrial policies," some nations have managed to go
from being "undeveloped" to "developed" by changing those products that they had a
comparative advantage in. For instance, in the twentieth century, Japan switched from
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with the largest amount of resources to spend on subsidies-to
provide them thus contributes to a more static, less efficient world
economy even though it is an economy from which some benefit.
B. The Composition of the SCM Shows the Political Compromises
Necessary to Secure Its Ratification
The political process that brought about the WTO (and the SCM
particularly) deserves much of the blame for the inadequacies that
will be discussed later in this Note. Parties negotiating the WTO
accords had dramatically different takes on the relative merits of
different kinds of industrial policy. 73 Regarding subsidies, for
instance, the rules established in the present SCM Agreement revise
those set in the Tokyo Round that were not signed by all members
because they did not agree with them. Some of this leeriness has
74
persisted.
The WTO Agreement divided subsidies into categories with three
different levels of prohibition. Because the WTO provides a rulesbased system, the definition of "subsidy" in the SCM Agreement is
problematic if it is unclear. 75 The tripartite framework put forward in
the SCM Agreement resulted from both the beneficial uses of
subsidies, and from the different perceptions of the utility of activist
industrial policy held by WTO Members. Rules-based systems use
precise definitions in order to segregate permissible from
impermissible conduct. 76 Such systems do so on the assumption that
such minimum preconditions ensure that the use of remedial
sanctions will be confined within sensible limits. 77 A defined limit to

having a comparative advantage in the production of low-quality knock-offs of Western
products to having an economy invested in producing high-technology items. Id.
73.
One of the reasons for the inclusion of subsidies into the WTO Agreements
was that under the original GATT-bargain, parties were free to manage their
economies so long as they did so in a fashion that did not harm others. The validity of
this "bargain" was undercut by the belief that some parties were shirking it due to such
an absolute indifference to this norm that they avoided subsidizing where it would lead
to negative effects. See Howse, supra note 1, at 101. This notion was compounded by an
ideological shift in the United States and United Kingdom toward anti-interventionist
economic policies. Id. Stopping interventionism (e.g., subsidization) in other countries
would give U.S. and U.K. industries the ability to compete in industries that without
subsidization of their own, they would be at a competitive disadvantage. Id.
74.
TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 30. Indeed, the Tokyo Round
Subsidy Code never contained a definition of the word "subsidy." Id.
75.
Howse, supra note 1, at 95 (describing the WTO as a "rules-based
negotiated" system). "Subsidy" has had a number of distinct definitions in the parlance
of U.S. trade law. See generally Wilcox, supra note 45 (discussing the variety of
different definitions that 'subsidy' has had in the history of United States trade law).
76.
See Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundationsof the
EntrapmentDefense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1053-54 (1987).
77.
Id. at 1054. Such minimum preconditions for punishment are built into
U.S. legal culture. Id. at n.145.
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the scope of permissible and impermissible conduct provides a
guarantee that a party violating the rule deserves punishment. 78 A
party punished for violating a clearly defined rule would deserve to be
punished for both retributive and preventative reasons. 79 A clear
definition of the impermissible act also preserves a sphere of
autonomy for the relevant actor. 80 Functional, clear rules thus both
prevent illegitimate action and improper punishment. 81 The SCM
Agreement, insofar as it does not provide clear rules, serves to
restrain state actions from neither "legal" subsidization, nor from
82
improper use of the DSU system to harass trading competitors.
However, unclear rules often result from bargaining situations.
The SCM introduced a number of modifications to the provisions
established following the Tokyo Round: it included more detailed
rules for calculating the amount of damages, more detailed

procedures for instigating and conducting subsidy and dumping
investigations, rules on the implementation and duration of antidumping measures, and particular standards for DSBs to apply in
SCM disputes.8 3 A subsidy, as defined by the SCM, is a financial
contribution made directly or indirectly by a government or public
body within the territory of a Member to some other party.8 4 The
SCM
divides
subsidies
into
three
categories:
"prohibited,"
"actionable," and "non-actionable" subsidies.8 5 Prohibited subsidies
include those which are tied directly to exports and would necessarily
have an effect on foreign economies. 86 Actionable subsides loosely

78.
Id. at 1054.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 1055.
81.
Id.
82.
However, it does not stop states from acting duplicitously regarding
implementing both rulings and violating the intent of the agreement. See discussion
infra note 265 and accompanying text.
83.
See generally id.
84.
See AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, April 15,
1994, GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS, Annex 1A, Multilateral Agreements on

Trade in Goods (1994) [hereinafter SCM]; ASIF H. QURESHI, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 271 (1999).
85.
JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 61-62 (1999).

86.
See SCM, supra note 84, at Part II. Prohibited subsidies are those which
require parties to meet particular export targets, or to use domestic rather than
imported goods. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note 12, at 31. They are prohibited
because they are specifically designed to distort international trade, and are therefore
likely to hurt other countries' trade. Id. When challenged under the WTO framework,
these subsidies can also be handled under an accelerated timetable. Id. If the dispute
settlement procedure finds that a subsidy is "prohibited" it must then be withdrawn.
Id. One country's subsidies can hurt a domestic industry in an importing country. Id.
They can also hurt parties trying to export goods into the market of the subsidizing
government. Id.
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correspond to existing GATT practice in that they are regarded as
possibly useful tools that also to have the potential to be that
damaging.8 7 Parties can only seek remediation on "actionable"
subsidies upon the occurrence, or threat, of either material injury.88
The third category of non-actionable subsidies includes those unlikely
to harm third parties (such as local public transport) and structural
adjustment measures "which need to be tolerated for the sake of cure
89
and must not be countervailed even in case of injury".
The danger of being overzealous in pursuing actions in regard to
one of these categories when actions do not clearly fit into it are
numerous. First, there is the danger that parties, fearing sanction,
will not subsidize in situations where those subsidies would benefit
their countries. Subsidies, unlike most of the other areas covered by
the WTO Agreements, have uses that result in both positive and
negative effects. 90 In fashioning rules regarding subsidies, perhaps
more so than in any other area, there is a need for precision: gaps and
ambiguities in the system leave countries either with a choice not to
give out "legal" subsidies out of fear of subsequent legal recourse, or
to face tremendous penalties for subsidies that they had deemed
legal. 91
Even attempting to remedy a dispute requires a highly political
calculation. A choice by a "harmed" country to sanction another
country's behavior in instances where they have "illegally" subsidized
requires two decisions to be made. First, a country must decide either
that the structural gains to the market diffusely are important
enough to force consumers to pay a higher price for the particular
subsidized commodity, or, more probably, that an industry in the
charging country is being faced with "unfair" competition. 92 At a
second level, the country also must decide that the transaction costs
encountered in dealing with the subsidy are worth adding in to

87.
See SCM, supra note 84, art. 5(b); see also CROOME, supra note 85, at 61-62.
In the case of actionable subsidies, the complaining country has to show that the
subsidy has an adverse effect on its interests. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note
12, at 31. If a country can show this, the subsidy is prohibited. Id. If it cannot, it is
permitted. Id.
88.

CROOME, supra note 85, at 62.

89.
Id. These can either be non-specific subsidies, or specific subsidies for
industrial research and pre-competitive activity, assistance to disadvantaged regions,
or assistance granted in certain types of situations where facilities need to be upgraded
to comply with new environmental regulations. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE, supra note
12, at 31.
90.
Id. (discussing possible benefits to world caused by subsidies).
91.

See CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOcRAcY: THE

FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 7 (2001) (stating that the WTO panel
and appellate body decisions are producing dire political conflicts and that the
underlying texts of the WTO lack the attributes necessary for a rules-based system).
92.
In part, this decision is made in the tripartite division of subsidies into
"prohibited" "actionable" and "permitted" categories.
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prosecute the claim. 93 These transaction costs might also need to
figure in the risk that the country charged with subsidization will
also file a counter-claim found to be meritorious with the WTO
asserting that the charging-country is also subsidizing. 94 Such
charge-and-countercharge situations have been fairly frequent in the
95
early case law.

93.
Id. For instance, legislators in a country seeking to promote fairness (while
also maintaining its "fair" subsidies) would have a payoff matrix modeled as such, if
the other party were not using techniques of gamesmanship (i.e., not reacting to the
charge of subsidization by filing a counter-charge):
COUNTRY A
COUNTRY B

94.
For instance, in such a situation where the '"ad" country was using
gamesmanship, in most situations, the payoffs could be hypothetically modeled as
such:
COUNTRY A

COUNTRY B

Do Not
Pursue

Do Not
Pursue
4,4

File
Counter-NAAction
I

File Action
5,1

1, 1
I

For instance, though the European aerospace giant exists largely as a result of
governmental largess, it is unlikely that the United States would file counter-charges
out of fear that Europe would respond by questioning the practices of the U.S.
aerospace industry. See Fisher, supra note 69, passim (discussing various ramifications
European aid for Airbus super-jumbo jets).
95.
Id. See also the discussion of the Brazil-Canada dispute contained in
Section 111.3.
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C. ProblematicDecision Making in Subsidy Remedy Decisions
1. United States-Foreign Sales Corporations and the Myth of the
Persistently Dumb Legislature
The saga that became United States-ForeignSales Corporations
began with a provision of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, replacing
the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) legislation as
the United States' major tax incentive for exporters. 96 The change
followed a controversy between the United States and its trading
partners, who claimed that the DISC constituted an export subsidy
violating the GATT. 97 Though the United States never conceded that
the DISC legislation violated the GATT, the Reagan Administration
proposed the replacement of the DISC with the Foreign Sales
Corporations (FSC) to soothe other GATT signatories, most notably
98
the European Economic Union.
As of 1986, the original FSC legislation had not accomplished the
goal of placating the EU. 99 In United States-Foreign Sales
Corporations (U.S.-FSC), the Panel was established to consider a
complaint by the European Communities concerning the consistency of
the U.S.-FSC Replacement and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act
(ETI Act) with the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994.100 This was,
to paraphrase terminology in a recent article, the United States' "third
strike" at the legislation. 10 1 The ETI Act was a measure taken by the
United States with a view to complying with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB in U.S.-FSC.10 2 The European Union did not think
that the ETI Act functionally withdrew the preferential treatment and

96.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984)
(codified throughout sections of 26 U.S.C.). Division A of the Act is the Tax Reform Act
of 1984; Division B is the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. Title VII of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 includes the Foreign Sales Corporation legislation. Pub. L. No. 98-369,
§§ 801-05, 98 Stat. 985-1103 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (Supp. III 1985)); see
also Ronald D. Sernau, The Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation: A $10 Billion
Boondoggle, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1181 n.1 (1986).
97.
See Sernau, supra note 96, at 1181.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Report of the Appellate Body, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the
European Communities,
United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations,"Jan. 14, 2002, WTJDS108/AB/RW; see also, ETI Act, Pub. L. No. 106519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
101.
See Sarah Ostergaard, Note, The Third Strike: United States'Attempts at
Achieving Tax Parity Between its Income Tax and the European Value-Added Tax, 27 J.
LEGIS. 421, 421 (2001).

102.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 100,
2. The recommendations
and rulings of the DSB resulted from the adoption, by the DSB, of the Appellate Body
Report in US-FSC, WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted March 20, 2000 (the "original Appellate
Body Report").
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subsidies complained of in the earlier case.' 0 3 The Appellate Body
agreed that the U.S. government's acts were in violation of Articles 3.1
and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement, Article 3.3 and 10.1 of the Agriculture
Agreement, and provisions of the GATT 1994 treaty. 10 4 Thus, the
process of remedying one particular "subsidy" was to continue ad
infinitum.105

The arbitrator assigned to find remedies for the dispute followed
the European Union's approach, and ordered that the United States
be penalized at the value of the subsidy and allowed them to suspend
concessions and other obligations up to this amount.' 06 Of the
rationales discussed in the three cases that were in issue in this case,
the reasoning put forth in the arbitrator's opinion was the most
sophisticated, and arguably the most agreeable. The level of sanction
in United States-ForeignSales Corporationscase is troublesome, but
not nearly as troublesome as the remedies encountered in the other
two cases, when one views it through a number of angles with the
07
Charnovitz lens. 1
Were the involved sanctions effective? The threat of sanctions
certainly was effective: the United States was revising its laws in
order to get into compliance with the WTO. However, in one sense the
actions of the WTO may have been too effective in that they imposed
a tremendous sanction on the United States in an instance where the
behavior was not particularly egregious.' 0 8 The level of sanction was
tremendously high.' 0 9 The fashion in which the sanction is to be
imposed is something commentators have viewed with measured
disdain. 110
It is problematic that the United States' third attempt at
remedying a twenty-year old subsidy dispute still resulted in a huge

103.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 100, 4.
104.
Id.
5, 256-57.
105.
See generally Ostergaard, supra note 101.
106.
Decision of the Arbitrator, Recourse to Arbitration by the United States
under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, United StatesTax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations", August 30, 2002, WT/DS108/ARB
7.1-8.1. The WTO authorized the EU to impose $4.043 billion in trade sanctions. See
Article, infra note 254, passim (discussing the status of 2003 trade negotiations).
Part of the reason for this might be that the SCM is profoundly unclear as
107.
to what is, and what is not, a prohibited subsidy. Another explanation might be that
Congress believed that there was an 'acceptable' alternative to adopting the VAT when,
in reality, there was not. A third might be that Congress just did not know what they
were doing.
108.
When one is evaluating incentives, the U.S. was trying to fulfill its
international obligations. For a variety of reasons, it failed.
109.
The WTO originally authorized the EU to impose four billion dollars of
trade sanctions on the US. See America's Taxing Trade Troubles, ECONOMIST GLOBAL
AGENDA, Aug. 21, 2001.
110.
See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 59, at 827.
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fine. 1 ' Why? Obviously, one of two things happened: either the
Members of Congress passing the resolution were not aware of the
categorization, or, more troublingly, they did not care that the
particular provision they were adopting could result in a charge of
subsidization." 2 For the purposes of this section, I will assume that
the former is the cause.
The WTO's dispute resolution system was premised on the
notion that legislatures are capable of making rational decisions. As
troubling as it may be, much literature in the social sciences
disagrees with this assumption. "Policymaking is not about rationally
debating, choosing and implementing solutions to problems; it is
about narrow political, bureaucratic, and other interest asserting
themselves-policy results from the subsequent multi-stranded tug of
war."1 1 3 "What happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but
rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion among
officials with diverse interests an unequal influence.""n 4 As such,
remedying disputes may be more difficult.
Public choice scholarship attempts to understand legislative
behavior. The belief that interest groups control much of what comes
out of a legislative branch is a proposition widely agreed with." 5 A
method through which individuals seek utility, often by using interest
groups is "rent seeking."" 6 Concentrated interests with small

111.
See discussion supra notes 89 and 94.
112.
Most assuredly, the members of Congress worried about the reaction of the
EU and the WTO in this case. After all, they were changing the legislation in order to
correct problems noted in a previous trade dispute.
113.
NESTER, supra note 69, at 15.
114.

GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLANATION OF THE CUBAN

MISSILE CRISIS 162 (1971). "[T]he best way to understand American government is not
as a government but as a set of governments; it is government by nonconsensual
directions." Peters, infra note 240, at 61.
115.
For analyses reflecting the dominance of interest groups generally, see
Easterbrook, Foreward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 1518, 51 (1984) ("One of the implications of modern economic thought is that many laws
are designed to serve private rather than public interests."); Richard Epstein, Toward
a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 713-15 (1984) ("The
interest group theory of legislation provides powerful evidence of the persistence and
extent of legislative abuse."); Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation
Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,
224, 229-36, 245 (1986) ("special interests tend to dominate"); John Shepard Wiley, Jr.,
A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-26, 769-73 (1986).
116.
Rent seeking was first discussed systematically by Gordon Tullock in 1967.
DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 229 (1989) (discussing Gordon Tullock, The
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224-32 (1967)). Rent
seeking causes social waste in three senses: first, resulting from the efforts and
expenses of the potential recipients of the monopoly; second, as regards the efforts of
government officials to obtain or react to the efforts of the potential recipients; and
third, as a result of distortions to the market, or to the government, as a result of the
rent-seeking activity. Id. at 230 (discussing James Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit
Seeking, in JAMES BUCHANAN, ET AL. (eds.), TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
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constituencies generally triumph over diffuse interests with more
narrow support. 117 "Groups such as consumers, tax-payers, the
unemployed, and the poor either do not have the selective incentives
or the small numbers needed to organize, so they [are] left out of the
bargaining."1' 18 With groups left out of bargaining, one could suppose
neither that the results were "fair" nor that they had the support of a
high percentage of social members: this is arguably what happens in
many cases involving trade subsidies: parties seek "help" from
legislatures not because they need it, but instead because they can.
Politicians and business interests often have goals that conflict
with the principle of treaty adherence. 119 Subsidies typically result
from the successful bargaining of concentrated interests to a
government body. Corporations and industries go to the government
and plead poverty, and seek to make their goods more competitive
through government action. 120 The long-term prosperity of a country
cannot be promoted by subsidies to rent-seeking inefficient firms even
though it could be enhanced if subsidies were given as a part of a
functional industrial policy. 121 By rewarding rent-seekers, an extra
tax is imposed on the prosperous. 122 Although one can see merit in
participating in a broader community in which individuals and
groups sell what they can produce with the greatest comparative
efficiency, people can secure a far greater quantity of goods than they
could produce for themselves, but they can also see a greater benefit
for themselves as individuals by profiting off of governmental
largess.' 2 3 Indeed, in making this decision, a rational subsidy-seeker

SOCIETY 3-15 (1980). For this discussion of subsidies under the WTO, it is the third
derivative criteria that is of concern. See discussion supraat note 12 and accompanying
text.
117.

See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 143 (1972)

('"The high degree of organization of business interests, and the power of these business
interests, must be due to ... the business community... "industries"... which contain
only a fairly small number of firms."). Special interest presence in trade politics has
long been noted. See E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFFS
283 (1935) ("The history of the American tariff is the story of a dubious economic policy
turned into a great political success . . . .The very tendencies that have made the
legislation bad, however, have made it politically invincible."); see also Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385,
403 (1992) (discussing subsides with their narrowly distributed benefits and their
widely distributed costs as classic "pork barrel" legislation procured by special
interests).
118.

MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 37 (1982).

119.
Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 167, 199 (1999).
120.
Id.
121.
JOVANOVI, supra note 66, at 29. See also discussion supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
122.
Id.
123.

I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 4 (1992).
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will now just factor in the likelihood, and the magnitude, of the WTO
intervening in her individual dispute, and calculate the benefit to
themselves. 124 The irony of the necessary remedy in a WTO dispute is
that it punishes the country but cannot get to the party actually
behaving badly. The group of legislators that provide those benefits,
in turn, face a secondary function, in which a WTO intervention
12 5
would have a similarly lessened effect.
Public choice scholarship would not support the traditional
126
assumption that the state is the prime mover in trade disputes.
While under the traditional approach states are seen as well-defined
actors seeking to pursue some economically rational objective, public
choice would argue that states function as devices that aggregate
preferences of their politically connected members regardless of any
damage their behavior would cause. 127 Economic analysis assumes
that this objective is to pursue maximization of national welfare. 128
However, taking into account public choice learning, some trade
commentators believe that a more realistic notion is to model
interstate economic activity as a two-stage process: in the first stage
political competition between
different interests
determine
governmental policy preferences, and in the second stage, there is an
international
give-and-take
that
determines
international
equilibrium. 12 9 International political interdependence sets the stage
for the first conflict, while the domestic political environment
constrains actions that a government can take internationally. 13 In
this setting, a country's political stance ends up representing the
organized political power of particular special interests versus the
13 1
governments concern for the plight of the average voter.
Thus, to enter into any trade agreement, the government
involved needs to believe either that the involved trade would be
relatively equal, or that other benefits of free trade would offset any
imbalance. 132 In the second step, politically powerful sectors would

124.
Hypothetically, one of the goals of the sanction would to be equal, and
remove the benefit from the party originally seeking the subsidy. One of the problems
with the SCM agreement is that it is unable to get to the parties who are the real cause
of the subsidies.
125.
That is, the utility of the legislator (UL) where c is the chance of retaliation,
P is the level of the penalty, and v is the amount that the average citizen would be able
to see and cognate that their representative caused the particular penalty an equation
such that UL = f(cPv).
126.
Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The Politics of Free-Trade
Agreements, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 667, 667 (1995).
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id. at 667-68.
130.
Id. at 668.
131.

Id.

132.
Grossman & Helpman, supra note 126, at 676. The only chance of a trade
agreement in a situation where there were imbalances between countries would occur
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generate exclusions, whereas smaller sectors would have to face
"pure" competition. 13 3 Parties unable to block a free trade
pact
entirely might still be able to interfere with the post-ratification
functioning of the treaty.
Assuming that the particular class receiving benefits of a
subsidized good is small relative to the total number of voters, there
is a high probability that that class would be able to function as an
effective interest group. 134 Thus, those actors would take political
action to maximize their collective welfare. 135 Even though a country
in a situation like this would suffer from a welfare loss, 136 for the
political actor, even if he were seeking to maximize contributions, it
would be rational to deviate from a policy of free trade. 13 7 Rent
seeking impacts the economy in two ways: first, indirectly by the rent
seeking expenditures leading to political decisions which distort
supply and demand of policies in markets, and second, by the
expenditures reducing productivity as far as society would have been
138
better off without them.
One strong possibility for the reason that the U.S. government
has been unable to provide legislation that pleased the European
Union is that the costs (for the interest group) of skewing the
legislative process involving the FSC were less than the costs that it
would have incurred in getting an exclusion from the WTO
Agreement entirely. "Foreign sales corporations" have neither the
psychological resonance, 139 nor the collective lobbying abilities 140 of
the groups that received negligibly more lenient treatment in seeking
to make them to comply with their problems meeting obligations
under the WTO Agreements. Apparently, Europe also probably does
not have a group similarly situated, as was the case with Airbus and
Boeing. 14 1 A second possibility would be that U.S. legislators, or
Congressmen, have a taste for either sovereignty, or the FSC taxing

when it was welfare-enhancing and the opposing special interests were unable to
coordinate their interests or to muster enough opposition to block the agreement.
133.
Id. at 680 ("Governments that are attempting to secure ratification of a
free-trade agreement can do so by providing long periods of adjustment to [large]
opposing sectors and by excluding others from the agreement entirely.").
134.
Id. at 669. See generally OLSON, supra note 117.
135.
See Grossman & Helpman, supranote 126, at 669.
136.
Id. at 670.
137.
Id. at 670.
138.

BRIAN GOFF, REGULATION

AND MACROECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE

14-15

(1996).
139.
For instance, U.S. citizens might be able to identify with injured farmers,
or out-or-work steelworkers. Legislators, thus, might be moved to help them more
readily as constituents could identify with them. Identifying with an "FSC" when
described as such seems fairly improbable.
140.
See discussion infra note 244 and accompanying text.
141.
See Fisher, supra note 69, passim.
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structure, that exceeds the social benefit that they perceive emanates
142
from changes that would make the FSC legislation agreeable.
Either answer presupposes that the solution to the involved problem
is tremendously problematic and difficult to resolve.
2. Australia-LeatherGoods and Problems with Traditional Notions of
Due Process
"Due process" notions are not foreign to WTO case law. There are
mentions of it in early disputes. 143 In Australia-SubsidiesProvided to
Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather (hereafter AustraliaLeather), the Appellate Body was again faced with the proper way to
address a violation to the SCM Agreement. 144 In 1995, Howe, a whollyowned subsidiary of Australian Leather Upholstery Pty. Ltd., which in
turn was owned by another Australian company called Australian
Leather Holdings, Limited (ALH), won a contract with General Motors
to supply automobile upholstery. 145 Howe was the only dedicated
producer and exporter of automotive leather in Australia. 146 On March
9, 1997, the Australian government signed two loan contracts with
Howe and ALH providing funding for an assistance package. 147 Under
this assistance package, a grant of A$30 million was paid out, and a
subsidized loan of A$25 million was given. 148 This assistance package
resulted from the excision of automotive leather from the Australian
Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Scheme and the Export Facilitation
Scheme for Automotive Products pursuant to a settlement agreement
with the United States reached in November 1996.149 On May 4, 1998,
the United States, spurred on by Howe's U.S. competitors, contested
the newer assistance program to ALH and Howe, alleging that the

142.
This is a problem that has arisen for the first time with the Uruguay
Round-type Agreements. See Howse, supra note 1, at 102 ("[T]he issue of who gains
and who loses within a given society rears its head and cannot be avoided or
suppressed by any idea tractable to technocratic management of the trading system.").
143.
See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11 of the SCM, Brazil-Export Financing Programmefor Aircraft, August 28,
2000, WT/DS46/ARB, § 2.1.
144.
Report of the Panel, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and
Exporters of Automotive Leather, May 25, 1999, WT/DS126/R,
10.1-10.3.
145.
Id.
2.1; see also Geoff Strong, Taking on the Tough Traders, THE AGE
(Melbourne), Aug. 18, 2001, News Extra, at 5.
146.
Report of the Panel, supra note 144, 2.1.
147.
Id. 2.2.
148.
Id.
2.3-2.4.
149.
Id.
2.5; see also id.
9.2; Settlement between United States and
Australia, WT/DS57/1, G/SCM/D7/1, Oct. 9, 1996.
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program violated Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. 150 On June 22,
1998, a Panel was established with standard terms of reference. 151
In the end, both the Panel and the Appellate Body concluded
that the assistance was improper under the SCM Agreement. 152 As
such, the Panel recommended that the prohibited subsidies be
"withdrawn" pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM agreement. 153 In
pursuit of this objective, Howe repaid the Australian government
A$8.065 million, "an amount which covered any remaining
1 54
inconsistent portion of the grants made under the grant contract.'
Australia
believed that this conclusion implemented the
recommendations and rulings in the dispute to withdraw the
measures within ninety days. 155 The United States disputed this
contention: it claimed that Australia's withdrawal of only A$8.065
million of the original A$30 million grant, and the provision of a new
A$13.65 million loan on non-commercial terms to ALH were
inconsistent with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB and
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. 156 Because of this disagreement, in
accordance with DSU Article 21.5, the matter was referred back to
the original Panel to make such findings as were necessary to remedy
157
the dispute.
After a grueling but inconclusive textual and contextual analysis
of Article 4.7 of the SCM, the Panel concluded that the remedy for
prohibited subsidies "withdrawal,. encompass[ed] repayment."'158
"Repayment is a means of 'withdrawing' a subsidy by which the
possibility of an importing Member imposing countervailing measure
on imported subsidized goods can be avoided."'1 59 This finding would
thus not allow parties to transform "prohibited" export subsidies paid
in the past into quasi-legal ones by removing the continuing export
contingency. 160 Article 4.7 of the SCM, which calls for withdrawal of a
subsidy, requires action dramatically different than Article 19.1 of
the DSU, which requires parties to "bring the measure into
conformity."'16 1 Thus Article 4.7 of the SCM permits "retrospective"

150.
Report of the Panel, supra note 144, T 9.7; see also Strong, supra note 145
(discussing the origination of the Australia dispute).
151.
Report of the Panel, supra note 144, T 9.7.
152.

Id. T 10.1.

153.
Id. 7 10.3.
154.
Report of the Panel, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United
States, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather, Jan. 21, 2000, WT/DS126/RW 1.3.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. 7 1.4.
157.
Id. 7 1.5.
158.
Id. TT 6.24-6.34.
159.
Id. 6.34.
160.
Id. 6.35.
161.

Id.

6.40.
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remedies, whereas the remainder of the agreements under the WTO
seem to favor "prospective" remedies. 162 The Court then concluded
that only repayment "in full" of the prohibited subsidy was necessary
to meet the definition of "withdrawal" in this case.' 63 Australia's loan
and payback did not encompass this withdrawal, and as such, some
additional action on the part of Australia was necessary to prevent
the United States from seeking additional sanctions against
Australia.
The "fines" imposed in Australia-Leather were the result of a
process that was both lengthy and costly. The sums of subsidy
involved were low, and a developed country filed the complaint. The
idea of some kind of reparation is a not novel development in trade
laws. Under the GATT, countries were asked to reimburse antidumping duties paid. 16 4 In New Zealand-Imports of Electrical
Transformers from Finland, the GATT Dispute Settlement system
required that improperly collected anti-dumping measures be
returned. On September 21, 1984, Finland requested the
establishment under Article XXIII:2 of a GATT Panel to examine the
GATT-consistency
of anti-dumping
proceedings. 16 5
As
the
communication indicated that the two parties had engaged in
consultations under Article XXIII:I which had not led to a
satisfactory solution, the Panel was established in October 1984 and
its report was adopted by the GATT contracting parties on July 18,
1985.166 The anti-dumping case against a Finnish exporter arose out
of a call for tenders by an electrical power board in New Zealand for
the supply of two transformers. 16 7 Following the acceptance of a bid
from a Finnish concern, a New Zealand company that had also bid for
the contract requested that the New Zealand Customs Department
initiate dumping proceedings against the Finnish exporter. 168 Duties
were imposed after a finding of prima facie dumping; recalled, and
then reinstated: in the end, the Finnish importer was forced to pay
NZ$49,543.16 9 In evaluating this claim, the GATT panel came to the
conclusion that these charges had no basis, and that New Zealand

162.
Id. 6.46.
163.
Id. 6.48.
164.
New Zealand-Imports of Electrical Transformers from Finland, July 18,
1985, GATT B.I.S.D. (32nd Supp.) at 55-70 (1986). This and other reports
recommending reimbursement are discussed in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann in GATT
Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law, 28 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 69, 74 (1991).
165.
Petersmann, supra note 164, at 74.
166.
Id.
167.
New Zealand-Importsof Electrical Transformers, supra note 164 2.1.
168.
Id.
2.2.
169.
Id. 2.4.
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had not demonstrated material injury. 170 Thus, the Panel
recommended to New Zealand that it revoke the anti-dumping
17 1
determination and reimburse the anti-dumping duties paid.
This is obviously the correct decision under the criteria put
forward by Charnovitz. 172 The involved sanction was at least facially
effective. Money wrongfully collected by New Zealand was returned to
the importer. Returning the money made the system appear more
legitimate. The "sanction"-if you can honestly call it that-was not
at odds with other norms of international law. In addition, the
sanction took back-at least symbolically-gains gotten by New
Zealand from an "illegal" policy that contravened international law.
However, such did not happen in this case. The principles of
international law are not universally transitive.
However, once a subsidy had been given to a corporation, the
lack of precedent proved to be a problem. The GATT contained no
agreement regarding subsidies. 17 Public international law has
historically recognized the duty of governments to repair or remedy
the damage that they have caused. 174 The Permanent Court of
International Justice stated this principle in the Factory at Chorz6w
case: "Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed."'175 Though GATT and WTO practices have differed
significantly from this norm, this provides a logical jumping-off point
176
through which to analyze how the case law develops.
In all of the SCM cases thus far, parties have argued about
whether measures could be forced to apply retroactively-that is,
whether a nation charged with a violation of the SCM would have to
recall subsidies already granted. 177 There is not the same dearth of
commentary about the two cases discussed in this Note where
subsidies were granted to broader groups than Howe in AustraliaLeather.178 Because Australia-Leather involves an individual

170.

Id.

171.
172.
173.

Id. 4.11.
Charnovitz, supra note 59, at 808.
See discussion supra notes 36-40.

4.9.

174.
DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 161 (1999).

175.
Id. (citing P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47-48).
176.
Id.
177.
See, e.g., Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 143,
86 (discussing the European
Community's objection to "withdrawing" a subsidy because WTO jurisprudence was not
supposed to function retroactively).
178.
See, e.g., Carrie Anne Von Hoff, Avoiding a Nuclear Trade War: Strategies
for Retaining Tax Incentives for U.S. Corporations in a Post-FSC World, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1349, 1349 (2002); Nicholas J. Minella, Motives and Consequences of the
FSC Dispute: Recent Salvo in a Long Standing Trade War or Fashioninga Bargaining
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corporation, the WTO's order for the Australian government to secure
the return of the subsidy resulted in Howe having their due process
rights infringed. It logically poses somewhat different problems than
the other categories of disputes.
This said, one positive out of the Australia-Leather decision is
that some of the parties involved appear to have learned.' 79 Howe,
though almost bankrupted by having to pay back a substantial
portion of the subsidy, had used the money to invest in technology
and staff training, and built a factory in Mexico to take advantage of
the NAFTA accords.' 8 0 This is a mixed message for the viability of the
SCM over the long term. In the first instance, it is good: the party
that sought subsidies did in fact learn from the experience and stop
seeking subsidies. The capital it presumably spent seeking rent was
consumed when the WTO ordered Howe to give the money back. In
another sense, because of the lack of due process, it is terrible: Howe
had sums of money that it had "earned" (albeit through a means
prohibited under the WTO Agreements) taken away from them
without the ability to defend themselves. At least as a matter of
principle, the Australian government would have had no real desire
to fight its case with the same vehemence as Howe would have
8
done.' '
3. Brazil-Aircraft: Of Political Economy and the Possibility of
Punitives
A third area where the WTO has investigated subsidies relates
to small commuter aircraft. In regard to trade in aircraft, "[t]here is
no such thing as a level playing field. 18 2 Because of the size and
strategic importance of the industry, because of its importance to the

Chip?, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1065, 1065 (2002); Sarah Ostergaard, The Third Strike:
United States' Attempts at Achieving Tax Parity Between its Income Tax and the
EuropeanValue-Added Tax, 27 J. LEGIS. 421, 421 (2001).

An Australian trade specialist advised caution for future export
179.
development: "The Americans took us on over Howe Leather, so the Government has to
consider its WTO obligations in any future decisionmaking." Jason Koutsoukis,
Steering a Clear Path for Auto Industry, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, March 22,
2002, NEWS, at 18, 18 (quoting Daniel Moulis, an Australian trade expert).
See Strong, supra note 145, passim.
180.
Perhaps, a better method for this case to be adjudicated would be for some
181.
party to bring a domestic action seeking an injunction against the Australian
government giving out this subsidy having gotten Howe in through an impleader,
claiming the Australian action was inconsistent with treaty obligations. Such actions
have historically not been favored. See generally Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S.
155 (1993) (rejecting claim that repatriation of Haitian refugees at sea violated the
U.N. Convention on Refugees); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
(finding the U.S. government's forced abduction of a Mexican citizen to be compatible
with the U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty).
J.A. Donoghue, Playing Fields; Influence of Government Subsidies on
182.
Aircraft Industry Competition, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, August 1991, at 2, 2.
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military, and because of the number of people it employs, countries
often provide massive subsidies in this area. 183 Theoretically, all
members of the WTO should benefit from the binding system
established through the DSU in the WTO regarding aircraft. 184 The
market for regional jet aircraft has been strong in the last decades:
between 1970 and 1998, the number of passengers on regional jet
aircraft grew at an average annual rate of 11.5 percent.1 8 5 Airlines
have been replacing turboprop aircraft with regional jets to the extent
that such aircraft now comprise more than eighty percent of the
orders for new aircraft.1 8 6 Competition between Canadian and
Brazilian interests are strong, and Brazil, through its lower labor
costs, was taking over Bombadier's customer base. 8 7 After
InterCanadian
Airlines
ordered six Empresa Brasileira
de
Aerondutica S.A. (Embraer) ERJ-145 jets, Onex, a merger partner,
claimed that InterCanadian had only made the purchase after being
offered very generous terms through Brazil's Programa de
188
Financiamento As ExportagSes (PROEX).
Canada, a Member of the WTO, 89s paid attention, and in BrazilExport FinancingProgrammefor Aircraft, a Panel was established to
consider a complaint by Canada regarding with respect to certain
export subsidies granted under the Brazilian PROEX program on
sales of aircraft to foreign purchasers of, Embraer, a Brazilian
manufacturer of regional aircraft. 190 PROEX sought to provide
interest rate equalization subsidies amount to 3.8 percentage points
of the actual interest rate on any particular transaction. 191 "The
lending bank charges its normal interest rate for the transaction, and

183.

See Fisher, supra note 69, passim.

184.

Helena D. Sullivan, Regional Jet Trade Wars: Politics and Compliance in

WTO Dispute Resolution, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 71, 71 (2003).
185.
Id. at 74 (citing Bombadier Aerospace Regional Market Outlook 1999,
SpeedNews Aircraft Fleet and Statistics, available at http://www.speednews.con

lists/lists.shtml).
186.
Id.
187.
Id. at 76 (discussing Mark MacKinnon, Brazil Has Much at Stake in Jet
Dogfight, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 3, 2001, at B1).
188.
Id. (citing Onex Would Push to Scrap CanadaDeal, MONEY, Nov. 2, 1999,
availableat http://allpop.com/AirMergers/nov2-aircanonexe.mbr.html).
189.
Or, more probably, Bombadier, a Canadian manufacturer of aircraft.
190.
Report of the Appellate Body, Brazil-Export Financing Programme For
Aircraft, Aug. 2, 1999, WT/DS46/AB/R,
1. Note that as in many other cases,
industries within the harmed country reacted to perceived slights. Seeing that there
had been no cases coming up before, it is possible that Brazil had taken solace in
Airbus not having been charged with doing the same thing. See Cong. Res. Serv. For
the Subcomm. On Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science,
Space and Technology, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Airbus Industrie: An Economic and Trade
Perspective, at 24-36 (Comm. Print 1992) (stating that European subsidies to Airbus
include, among other things, unpaid "loans" and exchange rate guarantees.)
191.
Id. 4.
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receives payment from two sources: the purchaser, and the
Government of Brazil. Of the total interest rate payments, the
Government of Brazil pays 3.8 percentage points, and the purchaser
pays the rest. In this way, PROEX reduces the financing costs of the
purchaser and, thus, reduces the overall cost to the purchaser of
1
purchasing an Embraer aircraft. 92
The Panel reached the conclusion that PROEX interest rate
equalization payments are subsidies within the meaning of Article 1
of the SCM Agreement, and are contingent upon export under Article
3.1(a) of that Agreement. 193 In reaching this conclusion, the Panel
found that the PROEX interest rate equalization payments were not
"permitted" under the first paragraph of item (k) of the Illustrative
List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of the SCM Agreement (the
Illustrative List). 194 The Panel also finally found that Brazil had
failed to comply with certain of the conditions of Article 27.4 of the
SCM Agreement, and that, therefore, the prohibition in Article 3.1(a)
of the SCM Agreement applied to Brazil. 195 Having found that
PROEX payments are inconsistent with Article 3.1(a), the Panel
recommended that Brazil withdraw the subsidies within ninety days
19 6
pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.
The Appellate Body was forced to grapple with the substance of
Article 4.7 of the SCM agreement. 19 7 Brazil argued that the Panel
had erred in establishing the ninety-day timeframe for withdrawal of
illegal subsidies, to which the Appellate Body responded in
determining that this was consistent with the language of Article 4.7
of the SCM, calling for a withdrawal of a prohibited subsidy "without
delay."'1 98 This was in addition to a finding by the Panel that Brazil's
actions also constituted a case of prima facie nullification or
impairment of benefits under Article 3.8 of the DSU accruing to
Canada under the SCM Agreement.' 9 9 In the end, this resulted in
Canada being allowed to violate the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures covering
a trade of $344.2 million per year until some other method of
200
remedying the violation was agreed to.

192.
Id.
193.
Id. 7.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Id. 99 188-94.
198.
Id. 1 191.
199.
Report of the Panel, Brazil-Export FinancingProgrammefor Aircraft, Apr.
17, 1999, WT/DS46/R, 9 8.3.
200.
Decision by the Arbitrators under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11
of the SCM, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Aug. 28, 2000,
WT/DS46/ARB,

4.1.
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In reaching this end, the board of arbitrators was forced to
grapple with difficult questions. Was the "subsidy" the entire amount
of money spent through PROEX or was it this total amount minus the
amount permissible? 20 1 The remedies the board imposed following
from the Brazil-Aircraft decision does not fair well when evaluated
under the other Charnovitz criteria. 20 2 Were the involved sanctions
effective? There is no simple answer to this question. Upon Canada
filing an action against Brazil, Brazil began to file a similar action
against Canada. 20 3 Such reciprocal actions under the WTO, as before
under the GATT, have been endemic given their effectiveness is a
difficult point to reach. 20 4 Should the industry have been distributed
in a similar fashion, it is possible that such actions would not have
been brought. 20 5 At present, bilateral discussions are proceeding
between Brazil and Canada upon the WTO's findings that each were
able to proceed with sanctions against the other. As of January 2003,
Investissiment Quebec, the investment arm of the Canadian province
of Quebec's government, was talking about significantly increasing its
loan guarantee program for exported regional jets. 20 6 Embraer (and
Brazil) believed that such an increase went completely against the
Canadian stance in ongoing bilateral talks to resolve their claims
discussed in this section. 20 7 Indeed, an Embraer vice president,
Henrique Rzesinski, said not just that such further guarantees
provided by Quebec would derail the then-current bilateral
negotiations, but also that any new guarantee would result in
Embraer requesting that the government of Brazil "investigate very
deeply" and "go back to the WTO if necessary."20 8 In response to the
Brazilian charge, the Bombadier spokesperson replied that the

201.
Id. 3.39.
See discussion supra, notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
202.
WTO Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
203.
Aircraft, Apr. 14, 1999, WT/DS70/R. A second stage of this dispute was finally resolved
in Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, Recourse to
Arbitration by Canada, Feb. 17, 2003.
204.
Id.; see also EU-Bananas,supra note 33.
205.
See discussion in Fisher, supra note 69 of the "bargaining game" going on
between the United States and Europe in regard to their major participants in the
aerospace industry.
Aaron Karp, Quebec May Increase Loan Guaranteesfor BombadierJets, AIR
206.
TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 23, 2003. The arm of the government has given $976
million (CAD) worth of loan guarantees to foreign buyers of Bombadier aircraft since
1996. Id. In 2002, Bombadier, suffering from air travel declines in the wake of
American terrorist attacks, a three-week long strike, and problems with Bombadier
produced Amtrak Acela's trains, issued its first profit warning ever, and came in with
revenues 65 percent lower than in 2001. See Rasha Mourtada, Buckle Your Seat Belts,
CANADIAN BUS., Sept. 16, 2002, at 57 (discussing Bombadier's recent business
performance).
207.
Karp, supra note 206.
208.
Id.
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Quebec loan guarantee program had been found to be "perfectly legal"
in 1999.209
The second difficult question faced by the Panel in regard to the
same issue was whether the level of countermeasures should
correspond to the amount of the subsidy granted by Brazil or be
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment suffered by
Canada. 2 10 Canada, in Brazil-Aircraft was allowed to suspend
concessions and obligations under the Textiles Agreement covering a
maximum amount of C$344.2 million per year. 211 In and of itself, this
is not problematic: it closely mirrors the amount that Canada, itself,
212
was fined for its retaliatory subsidies.
In a second respect, the arbitrator's assignment of a remedy is
problematic. The decision includes a discussion of "multipliers"
"caused" by the subsidy. 213 In discussing these "multipliers" the
arbitrator considers neither that these multipliers would probably
result in greater and not lesser trade (in terms of the subsidy), nor
the possibility that any remedy would also have "multiplied"
effects. 214 Neither noting these multipliers on only one side of the
equation nor noting them without exploring their ramifications in
makes either economic or judicial sense if one were attempting to
deter others from seeking subsidies. 215 None of the mistakes made by
the Board advance the appearance or the legitimacy of the WTO's
place in the world economic system. Indeed, assuming that the
parties to the WTO were rational contractors, 216 they should have

209.
Id. Whether the loan guarantees were, or were not legal, Brazil succeeded
in getting steeper penalties assessed against Canada, than it had against itself. See
Mario Osava, Politics-Brazil:Lula Likely to Take Tough Stance on FTAA, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Jan. 2, 2003.
210.
Decision by the Arbitrators, supra note 143, 3.40.
211.
Id. 4.1
212.
See discussion infra, note 233 and accompanying text.
213.
See portion of opinion quoted infra at note 227.
214.
'Trade multipliers" stem from macroeconomic theory. In essence, because
any sum of money introduced into any economy is spent more than once (before it is
"consumed" via saving or by being expended outside of the closed system) any amount
of money eliminated from an economy has effects at a multiple of its typical function.
See, e.g, Kenichi Miyazawa, Foreign Trade Multiplier, Input-Output Analysis and the
Consumption Function, 74 Q.J. ECON. 53, 53-64 (1960) (discussing foreign trade
multipliers as a function of the consumption function); Douglas Dosser, NationalIncome and Domestic-Income Multipliers and Their Application to Foreign Aid
Transfers, 30 ECONOMICA 74, 74-82 (1963) (providing further modification and
clarification of the concept of trade multipliers).
215.
Charnovitz, supra note 59, suggests that it is important to note whether the
particular sanction would advance or detract from the prestige and legitimacy of the
WTO.
216.
E.g., they chose a particular formation in the documents based on a
calculated likelihood that an Appellate Body or DSB reviewing them would choose the
most logical reading of the Agreement in dispute.
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been infuriated. 217 With these considerations in mind, the arbitrators'
response (in paragraph 3.55) to Brazil's allegation that the level of
218
damages were "punitive" is also not logically compelling.
However, it might make economic sense if the Board were
attempting to deter parties from seeking to subsidize in the future.
Assuming that these errors were intentional, Brazil-Aircraft's
embrace of "punitive" damages might actually work toward halting
subsidization. 2 19 Though punitive damages were not included in the
final version of the WTO Agreements, they were considered in the
Draft Articles. 220 Because of the infrequency of actions being brought
under the SCM, there may be reason for damages to be assessed at
levels that are higher than one-to-one. The arbitrators' willingness to
use the more extreme measure of damages and their improper (or at
least careless) calculation of the "subsidy" might be an attempt to get
221
to an "effective" level of damages without changing the agreement.

217.
E.g., because their expectations would be thwarted, and thus, they would
be losing more value than they would be getting. Alternatively, the parties could have
viewed ex ante the likelihood of actions being brought against them under particular
formations of documents. In such situations, the parties would be participating in
gamesmanship, as opposed to "rationally" contracting. They should only be infuriated
because they bet wrong.
Indeed, if the intent were just to remove he bad from the good, they would
218.
have had to begin doing this several steps earlier. Paragraph 3.55 of the Panel opinion
reads as follows:
Brazil also claimed that countermeasures based on the full amount of the
subsidy would be highly punitive. We understand the term "punitive" within
the meaning given to it in the Draft Articles. A countermeasure becomes
punitive when it is not only intended to ensure that the State in breach of its
obligations bring its conduct into conformity with its international obligations,
but contains an additional dimension meant to sanction the action of that
State. Since we do not find a calculation of the appropriate countermeasures
based on the amount of the subsidy granted to be disproportionate, we conclude
that, a fortiori, it cannot be punitive.
Decision by the Arbitrators, supra note 143, 3.55.
In common-law tort actions, punitive or exemplary damages are allowed
219.
where a defendant was reckless, wanton, grossly negligent or acted with malice, in
contrast to ordinary compensatory damages that could be awarded upon a showing of
negligence. JASON SCOTT JOHNSON, IMPERFECT INFORMATION AND THE LEGAL PROCESS:

TOWARD A GENERAL ECONOMIC THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY 118 (1989). "Compensatory
damages which are systematically lower than actual harm provide an independent
rationale for punitive damages." Id. at 130. Johnson discusses that in situations where
there is not a one-to-one correlation between a prohibited act and a remedial action,
one needs to discount the effect of any "damage" assessed against any actor by their
perception of the probability of that action. Id.
ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL
220.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 45 (2001).

ECONOMY:

UNDERSTANDING

THE

221.
See discussion supra note 106 (discussing calculation of the amount of
subsidy) and notes 107-08 (discussing the level of damage caused through multiplier
effects).
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Such an attempt, though, would be in violation of the express
wording of the SCM. 222 The SCM barred the use of punitive damages
for a number of reasons. The danger posed by over-prevention in the
context appears to exceed any benefit that could be realized from
using "punitive" sanctions. In contrast with dumping matters,
subsidies by definition result from government action as opposed to
some action by private actors. If the remainder of the opinion did not
appear so sloppy, it could serve as a low valence way to get to such
damages while forestalling effective opposition. 223 Though punitive
damages could provide the appropriate incentives to legislative bodies
in Member States to stop subsidizing, allowing the award of punitives
would functionally undermine the logic that underlies the tripartite
division of subsidies into categories with different levels of
appropriate action. For this reason alone, it appears that the various
components of the WTO should be more careful with their
measurements.
As such, the answers that this board of arbitrators found are
troublesome. To answer the first question, the board, relying on
Article 4.7 of the SCM, stated:
We are therefore of the view that the subsidy to be withdrawn within
the meaning of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, and consequently the
one on which we must base our calculations, is the full amount of the
PROEX interest rate equalisation payments on exports of Brazilian
regional aircraft, not the portion of those payments which goes beyond
the CIRR rate or any other appropriate benchmark rate under item (k)
224
of the Illustrative List.

Its answers to this question are unsatisfactory in their phrasing
alone, even before one gets to the included substance. First, boards of
arbitrators must work to have a clear command of the language they
are in which speaking. 225 Second, given that the subsidy section of
the WTO was established with an intent to divide 'beneficial'
subsidies from bad ones, it would have been logical to subtract the
amount permissible from the total subsidy. Unfortunately, the logical
gaps and inconsistencies of the board do not end there. Paragraph
3.51 of the opinion, uses an overly textual reading of draft articles to
confound the possibility that the countermeasures applied may make

222.
See discussion infra at note 226 (regarding the proper characterization of
damages under the SCM).
223.
As discussed supra, notes 93-95, in particular situations, parties will not
bring claims against other countries under the WTO system.
224.
Decision by the Arbitrators, supra note 143, 3.40.
225.
For instance, the quoted sentence has somewhere around seventy words,
and several alternative and subordinate clauses. Lawyerly language is good when it
clarifies; it is not good when it murders the eloquence upon which clear thoughts can be
passed from one person to another. Charnovitz, supra note 59, discusses a variety of
notions that would help the WTO to develop legitimacy.
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some sort of economic or analytical sense. 226 Paragraph 3.54 applies
the notion that subsidies have "multiplier effects" to justify using one
measure of the subsidy over another without then applying those
same effects when dealing with the involved remedy. (Canada's
proposed suspension of concessions and other obligations would also
227
have effects that exceeded their monetary amount.)

226.

Section 3.51 reads:

We agree that, as those footnotes are drafted, it seems difficult to clearly
identify how the second part of the sentence ("in light of the fact that the
subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited") relates to the first
part of the sentence ("This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures
that are disproportionate"). This is probably due to the use of the words "in
light of the fact that." However, since the text of the treaty is supposed to be
the most achieved expression of the intent of the parties, we should refrain
from second guessing the negotiators at this point. We can nonetheless note
that the reference to the fact that the subsidies dealt with are prohibited can
most probably be considered more as an aggravating factor than as a
mitigating factor. We also find the use of the word "disproportionate" to be
interesting in light of the term "out of proportion" used in Article 49 of the
Draft Articles. We do not draw any firm conclusions as to the meaning of
footnotes 9 and 10. However, we note that footnotes 9 and 10 at least confirm
that the term "appropriate" in Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM Agreement
should not be given the same meaning as the term "equivalent" in Article 22 of
the DSU.
227.

Paragraph 3.54 reads as follows:

Our interpretation of the scope of the term "appropriate countermeasures" in
Article 4 of the SCM Agreement above shows that this would not be the case.
Indeed, the level of countermeasures simply corresponds to the amount of
subsidy which has to be withdrawn. Actually, given that export subsidies
usually operate with a multiplying effect (a given amount allows a company to
make a number of sales, thus gaining a foothold in a given market with the
possibility to expand and gain market shares), we are of the view that a
calculation based on the level of nullification or impairment would, as
suggested by the calculation of Canada based on the harm caused to its
industry, produce higher figures than one based exclusively on the amount of
the subsidy. On the other hand, if the actual level of nullification or
impairment is substantially lower than the subsidy, a countermeasure based on
the actual level of nullification or impairment will have less or no inducement
effect and the subsidizing country may not withdraw the measure at issue.
Id.
3.54. This is another confusion that stems from the nature of the involved
subsidy. Given the plausible possibility of beneficial effects of a subsidy, this method of
calculation is troublesome. See generally discussion Section III.A., particularly at note
68. Subsidies do not cause "barriers" to trade. Id. They are problematic only so far as
they cause markets to become skewed from their optimal function. Indeed as far goes
multiplier effects, if one wants to discuss them, the Suspension of Concessions and
Other Obligations offered to Canada also would logically have similar effects. The
implicit assumption that the market is dynamic before ex ante the subsidy, but not
after it, is not compelling. Id.
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Setting aside the legal question (as "punitive" damages are
certainly improper under the law of the WTO) "deterrence" is a basic
legal concept. 228 Choosing a particular sentence in a criminal context
has multiple rationales under it. "Courts have generally seen their
task as one of fitting the penalty to the particular degree of iniquity
and dangerousness of the offender's conduct on this particular
occasion. '229 A sentence is viewed as both punishment and a public
denunciation of the harm done. 230 Punishment is ostensibly designed
to satisfy the demand for retaliation by the public which serious
crimes often arouse.23 1 Richard Posner states that a rational firm
would aggregate the expected punishments and discount them by the
probability of their imposition to determine the expected punishment
cost for engaging in a prohibited behavior, in accordance with the
formula E(c) = pf, where c is cost, p probability of sanction, and f fine
23 2
(or some form of criminal sanction.)
Deterring "illegal" subsidies like those discussed in Section III
can only be successful under one of two premises: first, some method
could be found to keep parties from bargaining for benefits conferred
by the government; or two, some method could be found to develop a
concentrated interest at the governmental or social level to
counterbalance pressure from concentrated groups. In the BrazilCanada dispute over aircraft, though Brazil was claiming over three
billion dollars of damages, 233 Bombadier (the Canadian producer of
aircraft) cheerfully described the outcome as "an issue that is being
discussed and dealt with between the governments of Canada and
Brazil" and at the end of the day "probably would not have anything
to do with aircraft. '23 4 If they did have something to do with aircraft,
perhaps then aircraft companies would stop behaving so badly.
D. The Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 and the
Byrd Bill: Subsidies as Politically Necessary Trade-offs
Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes, in a recent article, indicate
that with time, it is likely that pro-WTO constituencies will develop

228.
BLACK'S LEGAL DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) defines "deterrence" as "the
process of discouraging certain behavior, particularly by fear."
229.
J. C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (1992).
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 47 (2d ed. 2001).

233.
They were eventually allowed to impose $250 million in retaliatory
sanctions against Canada. Bloomberg News & Wire Reports, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, FL), Dec. 25, 2002, at 3D.
234.

The WTO Dispute, BUSINESS & COM. AvIATION, Jan. 2003, at 78.
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in most signatory nations. 23 5 They argue that this is likely because
with time, no competitive rates of return will be able to be achieved
on capital, and also, that sunk costs in particular industries will
diminish. 23 6 In this Section, I will suggest that, this might not be the
case with subsidies, and in fact, the suggestion itself borders on the
ridiculous.
Countries' stances on "industrial policy" issues are more complex
than scholars let on. Generally, such issues are viewed in isolation:
problems facing specific firms or industries are identified, and
governmental actions follows in an attempt to solve them. 23 7 Issues of
subsidization tend, then, to be discrete and numerous. 23 8 Though
commentators have noted that U.S. bargaining posture in the latest
round in WTO negotiations favored U.S. financial interests at the
expense of U.S. interests in manufacturing, 239 of late, the United
States has become much more willing to favor an activist industrial
policy. 2 40 Though the United States has favored a lassiez faire
approach to the marketplace since at least the 1960s, 241 the growing
sense of crisis and strain brought on by economic competition by
24 2
other countries has led many to call for changes in this policy.
Such activist policy is illustrated by George W. Bush's treatment
of the steel industry. Recently authors have suggested that insofar as
governments work to give subsidies to discourage factor-exit from a
distressed industry, domestic welfare gains can be achieved without
the typical beggar-thy-neighbor problems associated with typical

235.
See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of
Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S179, S194 (2002).

236.

Id.

237.
238.
239.

RICHARD D. BINGHAM, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AMERICAN STYLE 43 (1998).
Id.
See The WTO: A Train Wreck in Progress, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 410, 419

(2000).
240.

B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Industrial Policy in the United States, in

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 47 (Steven A. Shull & Jeffrey C.

Cohen eds. 1986)
241.
William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests:
Implementing the Doha Round, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 951, 960 (2002). See generally
JAMES SHOCH, TRADING BLOWS: PARTY COMPETITION AND U.S. TRADE POLICY IN A

GLOBALIZING ERA (2001) (discussing trade policies in the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton
Administrations).
242.
Lovett, supra note 241, at 960; see also Steel Unemployment Continues to
Rise, METAL CENTER NEWS, Mar. 1, 2002, at 56 (discussing calls by the United
Steelworkers of America for increases in tariffs on steel imports); Lynn R. Williams, No
GATT Deal Better than an Unfair One, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 8, 1993, at 9B
(stating that countries such as Japan and China were pushing for biases in trade laws
causing United States antidumping laws to be more difficult to use).
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government protection. 243 Other studies show that industries that are
highly organized and employ unskilled, low-wage workers frequently
try to acquire, and frequently receive, trade protection.2 44 Other
commentators note that countries tend to subsidize more during
economic downturns, and less during times of plenty.2 45 They tend to
subsidize large industries with high fixed costs and relatively
immobile, hard-to-retrain workers.2 46 When choosing to subsidize,
countries often cite national security reasons. 24 7 Such rationales
largely provide the "public interest" cover that public choice theorists
discuss. 248 Finally, parties often provide industrial subsidies to
interests that are being "protected" from "unfair" foreign
249
competition.
Given this, choosing to follow the WTO SCM guidelines
regarding subsidies could become increasingly problematic over time.
Countries are aware that the definitions provide large gray areas.
However, they are also aware that other countries are reluctant to
bring claims before the WTO. 250 In many cases, legislators, in seeking
subsidies are also aware that providing them is a veritable political
gold mine. Combining with the classical economic notion of the
business cycle, 2 51 which, though disliked by Keynes, 252 has some
applicability in discussing at least sector-specific industries (like
steel), something that could be disruptive to the fabric of the WTO
2 53
comes into view.

243.
Theresa M. Greaney, Strategic Trade and Competition Policies to Assist
Distressed Industries, 32 CANADIAN J. ECON. 767, 767 (1999). In this situation,
"deadweight" loss distortions caused by government intervention are compared against
the effects caused by exit of firm assets: (1) consumers lose due to reduction in product
variety; and (2) they lose pro-competitive effects that each additional firm brings to an
imperfectly competitive market. Id. at 768.
See SALVATORE, supra note 61, at 272.
244.
245.
See, e.g., BINGHAM supranote 237, at 11-12.
246.
See generally Peters, supra note 240, at 50 (discussing the high amount of
pressure in the "Rust Belt" to bail out declining, especially heavy, industries). For
instance, auto workers who do find jobs after being laid off have had to accept 30
percent less money in wages and many fewer fringe benefits. Id. Peters also claims that
newer industries-who, most probably could best benefit from subsidies, as discussed
supra note 69-receive them in smaller amounts due to their smaller political base. Id.
at 52.
247.
Id. at 50.
248.
Id. (discussing THE POLITICS OF REGULATION passim (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1980)).
249.
Id. at 51.
250.
See discussion supra notes 93-94.
251.
Discussed by economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo; in describing
it, Warren Harding stated, "[T]here has been vast unemployment before, and there will
be again. There will be inflation and depression just as surely as tides ebb and flow."
See NESTER, supranote 69, at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
252.
253.
"[B]oth the steel and automobile industry have experienced similar cycles of
catch-up to foreign rivals, global dominance, decline and renaissance." Id. at 15.
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Enter a distressed steel industry and agricultural interests that
have been subsidized for generations. The U.S. Congress has been
angry in its perceived belief that the U.S. was being treated unfairly
at the WTO, and also that it has not been able continue effectively to
use its antidumping laws. 254 Both the Byrd Amendment 255 (seeking
to protect the steel industry) and the US-FSC disputes were major
upsets for the United States. Trade issues already have a degree of
valance: President Bush has instituted tariffs in order to give the
U.S. domestic steel industry time to modernize. 25 6 A negative result
in regard to this third tariff-related matter, could prove exponentially
problematic if parties who wanted subsidies could efficiently organize
25 7
against free-trade principles generally.
Bush's actions have some basis in that the steel industry is one
of the most "distorted" industries in the world. 258 Prior to the last
decade of privatizations worldwide, governments owned seventy-five
percent of worldwide capacity. 259 Currently, governments still control
twenty-five percent. 260 As noted above, the foremost goal of the WTO
dispute settlement system is for the parties to reach a mutually
agreed settlement, or, failing that, to secure the withdrawal of
measures found inconsistent with a WTO agreement. 261 Because of
the pressures on domestic governments to subsidize, and because of
the pressures imposed by the world-system, there are many pitfalls
that can stymie the WTO's subsidy regimes. If countries fail to bring
subsidies actions in a regular fashion, 26 2 or if damages cannot

254.
Stupid, Stupid, Stupid!, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Feb. 2, 2003 (discussing
status of WTO negotiations occurring in 2003).
255.
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. The Byrd
Amendment, named for its sponsor, Senator Robert Byrd, transfers antidumping and
countervailing duties to U.S. companies that petitioned the U.S. Government for
protection. AIIS Applauds WTO Decision Declaring 'Byrd Amendment' Illegal, Jan. 22,
2003. On Jan. 16, the WTO Appellate Body declared the law illegal. Id. The United
States, acting through USTR officials, though calling the decision "disappointing," said
that they would comply with the decision. Id.
256.
Article, U.S.-European Union Trade Spats Will Stall WTO Trade Talks,
KIPLINGER LETTER, Jan. 24, 2003.
257.
Assuming that during the course of the previous actions, some solution for
the "steel crisis" has not been found (i.e. industry integration, removal of pension
obligations, etc.) and that the industry's political capital does not decrease in the
interim.
258.
Lost Jobs, More Imports: Unintended Consequences of Higher Steel Tariffs
(Part II): Hearing Before Committee on House Small Business, 107th Cong. (2002)
(Statement of Grant D. Aldonas Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade,
Department of Commerce).
259.
Id.
260.
Id.
261.
See generally DSU supranote 21, art. 3.
262.
Because bringing such actions in a regular fashion raises the "cost" of a
subsidization in particular instances.
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successfully take into account that countries do not bring subsidy
actions in similar proportions to other areas, the probability that a
WTO-based subsidy regime would tend toward preventing countries
from subsidizing exports in a prohibited fashion is low. 263 By the
same logic, countries will be discouraged from bringing subsidization
actions if it is likely that (a) the other country will respond by
bringing counter-charged of subsidization, or (b) the other country
will not respond to a decision made by the WTO.
For political actors, providing help to "suffering" industries has a
tremendous payoff.264 Ideology often takes a second place to practical
political considerations. 26 5 Keeping industries competitive is a key to
keeping both legislatures and members of the executive in possession
of their jobs. 266 The danger in having the WTO act as the world's
preventer of trade subsidies is that it increases the probability that
the WTO will fail and take principles of free trade with it. 267 This
would not be positive: it would probably result in the protectionist
"summum malum" with which the Note opened. 268 It is probable that
the parties angry with subsidization would push for leaving the WTO
entirely rather than for the more narrow goal of modifying the SCM if
only because "the WTO," broadly construed, provides a more tangible
269
political issue.

263.
One of the major arguments of this Note is that subsidy regimes under the
WTO are especially problematic because of the likelihood that the constituencies
favoring subsidization will prevail over those opposed to it without an
acknowledgement of this, the WTO risks becoming self-defeating.
264.
See discussion supranotes 119-25 and accompanying text.
265.
See, e.g., Shane Wright, Analysis-Is Bush a Free Trade Sailor or a
Protectionist Pirate, AAP NEWSFEED, Mar. 6, 2002, Financial News (discussing the
apparent hypocrisy of U.S. trade policy, specifically its willingness to impose steel
tariffs while bringing actions against Howe, discussed supra); see also Shane Wright,
Fed: Bush's Trade Credentials on Line over Lamb Decision, AAP NEWSFEED, May 30,
2001, General News (discussing the apparent hypocrisy of U.S. trade policy, specifically
its unwillingness to abide by the WTO decision regarding Australian lamb while
forcing compliance by Howe).
266.
Indeed, in addition to fighting for subsidization, to attempt to be
competitive in the world market, U.S. steel companies have, of late, had to have
government bailouts of pre-existing pension obligations. See, e.g., Barely Standing,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 2003, § BUSINESS, at C-1 (discussing possible

bailout by the U.S. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) of WheelingPittsburgh Steel Corporation); Paul M. Krawzak, Steel Makes Strides After Tariffs
Imposed, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 7, 2003, § ILLINOIS SPOTLIGHT (discussing, in
part, PBGC bailouts at LTV and Republic Steel Corporations).
267.
See discussion supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Robert J.
Samuelson, War's Economic Side Effects, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 19, 2003, at A29
(discussing economic problems exacerbated by major powers' mutual lack of trust).
268.
Id.
269.
See, e.g., Krawzak, supra note 266 (discussing how penalties imposed on
foreign steel helped the U.S. steel industry consolidate toward becoming competitive).
If the United States had been able to directly subsidize its "failing' industry, tariffsarguably more attributable and less efficient than subsidies-would not have been
used. The tariffs imposed by the Bush Administration have resulted in a significant
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IV. CONCLUSION

Thus, at the end of this Note, the same problems remain.
Avoiding a protectionist summum malum is a problem. Remedying
subsidy disputes poses a unique problem that could contribute to a
worldwide resurgence in protectionism. Subsidies are both
intrinsically difficult to remedy, and especially difficult given the
world-system of which they are a part. Public choice suggests that
there may be no easy answer for the problems posed by subsidies.
270
Minor tinkerings such as changes in the sorts of remedies allowed,
changes in the time frames for states to counter charges, changes in
the DSU,271 and changes in the SCM itself could have some benefit;
none of them singularly or in combination seem to provide any clear
answer. This said, finding good answers to these problems will
require continued political support for the WTO, for prohibiting
subsidies generally and a summum malum in particular.
As it stands, at the very least, the SCM Agreement is not faring
well currently. The SCM has resulted in the WTO trampling over
national sovereignty, the SCM Agreement has not resulted in fairer
trade in the cases discussed in this Note, Member States are not
bringing as many subsidy actions as they could bring, and it seems
that the WTO's problems regarding the SCM might represent more
than just some minor institutional or doctrinal growing pains. The
SCM has caused the Appellate Body to write at least one nonsensical
opinion. The notion that state-based remedies are appropriate means
for dealing with rent-seeking behavior is somewhat dated, and leads
to a fair amount of incoherence in possible remedy-outcomes. 272
Indeed, punishing the United States for subsidies granted to the steel
industry might be counterproductive so far as the monies for those
subsidies actually resulted in gains to Japanese manufacturers or
European consumers; it would be hard for the WTO to punish the
steel companies and labor unions that fought the subsidies initially.

response by other WTO members. See, e.g., China to Renew Plea for Panel on Steel
Tariffs, XINHUA ECONOMIC NEWS SERVICE, June 20, 2002, WORLD NEWS.
270.
Charnovitz, supranote 59, at 826.
271.
For the purposes of the argument contained in this Note, this option will
not be discussed.
272.
The WTO system, in focusing on state-based remedies, generally is not
deferential to non-state based actors. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of
Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INVL L. REV. 979, 986-87
(2001) (discussing whether NGOs have an ability to have their positions considered in
WTO trade disputes). However, so far as one accepts the proposition that subsidies are
caused by political pressure by interest groups letting interest groups contribute to
WTO decision making does not seem to be entirely helpful.
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So far as parties could foist punishment on citizens of other countries

for conduct that benefited them, public choice analysis would suggest
that subsidization would not stop. For the good of the world trading
system, it is imperative that we not just remain in a state of
omnipresent befuddlement, but instead think harder.
Public choice analysis would suggest that the goal of the WTO in
regard to the SCM and Agricultural subsidies must be to find a way
to build constituencies in those countries that fight special interest's
push for money while not alienating parties to the point that they
either leave the WTO, or force a renegotiation and a carve-out that
allows the government to subsidize. A simple way to do this is not
readily apparent. The beginnings of an approach would be for
Appellate Panels and Dispute Bodies to not be as glib about their
calculation as they were in Brazil-Aircraft. More collaborative
approaches-as suggested in the DSU and by the Panel in AustraliaLeather-might not be as appropriate in the context of subsidization
because of the likelihood that they would be perceived as an
international government directly interfering with a sovereign
nation. 273 However, they would allow for parties themselves to defend
the positions they had bargained for.
Perhaps fines might provide a more valid approach to assure
compliance to violations of the WTO agreements. 274 There is
precedent for this action in the form of actions by the European Court
of Justice in which the court agreed to a penalty of 20,000 euros per
day against Greece for failure to implement waste disposal
directives, 275 and of a subsequent instance in which the French
government changed a labor law in response to an action by the
Commission to seek a penalty payment against them. 276 Logically,
fines should theoretically assure compliance by parties with the
norms intermeshed in the WTO Agreement. 277 The advantages of
using fines, as opposed to the current set-up as far as remedies, would
be numerous. Fines are visible. Compared to other results of WTO
hearings, they can be seen and noted. Fines could be used by little
273.
It is noted that one possibility of malformed remedies would be for
countries to not allow disputes to advance clear through the dispute settlement
process. However, given the problems involved in characterization of subsidies and
remedy of subsidies, both discussed supra, this does not appear tremendously likely.
More probably, countries would choose a second option, e.g., not bringing disputes
(because of the likelihood that any dispute largely brought at the behest of a domestic
producer would result in an investigation of the governmental largess that that
producer had previously benefited from).
274.
Charnovitz, supranote 59, at 825-27.
275.
Greece Hit for Waste Dumping as ECJ Sets First Fine for Law Compliance
Failure,23 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 558 (July 19, 2000). Greece made its first payment
in December 2000. Charnovitz, supra note 59, at 826 n.280.
See Charnovitz, supra note 59, at 826-27; see also France Scraps Ban on
276.
Women in Night Jobs, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 2000, at 2.

277.

See Charnovitz, supra note 59, at 826.
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countries against big ones, and by big against small. 278 With this, it
would be hypothetically possible for citizens in a democratic state to
then elect representatives who would not result in continuing market
sanctions. Fines would also be less market-skewing. It does not make
sense to impose costly inefficiencies in order to remedy inefficiencies.
They might also provide more direct punishment for bad parties:
especially if there were some method through which countries could
pass through costs to the parties who had caused them to be. Finally,
fines have a great deal more support in the academy than other
remedies under the WTO.
However, fines would probably suffer from the same sort of
problems as were discussed in this Note: they could be punitive, they
would be nearly impossible fairly to calculate, and they might also be
dramatically incommensurate with any actual harm done to the
trading system. Additionally, rent seekers would continue rationally
to spend resources to resist reform and protect the transfers that
benefited them. 279 Indeed, the current form of remedy provides no
constituency with an ex ante incentive to resist subsidization. 28 0 In
addition to this, the tripartite breakdown of subsidies into three
categories only exacerbates the situation: the bargaining game that
led to this division did not account for problems caused by no clear
answers at the end. Even with an acknowledgment of possible
benefits, fines probably would not have any effect on subsidization
differing from the current system. They could also result in a general
loss of support for the WTO generally. The constant tension between
fulfilling the promise of the post-SCM world exists alongside tension
that an overzealous application of the SCM could result in a longterm weakening of the WTO.
A third set of options-that the WTO should be abandoned, or
the subsidies accords removed-does not appear worthy of serious
consideration because, at present, it does not appear to command
elite-level political support. As unappealing and problematic as the
first two options are, it is quite possible that this third method would
be worse if the goal of the WTO system is to avoid the protectionist
summum malum discussed at this Note's outset. Entirely giving up
on the WTO now would likely cause a new round of protectionist
behavior. However, neither the notion that the United States should
leave the WTO, 281 nor that the WTO as it currently stands is

278.
279.

However, fines would still suffer from strategic gamesmanship.
Ralph D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in DENNIS C. MUELLER

(ed.),

PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 524 (1997).

280.
E.g., in so far as parties are rent seeking, there is nothing to get parties
motivated to work against them.
281.
See, e.g., Article, Thomas Warns of Pending Trade Challenges with Europe,
NATIONAL JOURNAL'S CONGRESSDAILY, Feb. 13, 2003, § Trade (stating that many
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unsubstainable are entirely novel. 282 William Lovett points out that
during the Seattle Round of negotiations, trade policy "consensus" did
not exist: there were breakdowns within the United States, between
the United States and the European Union, and between "rich"
nations and most developing nations. 283 It often seems that those
members of the general public who think about trade often are not in
favor of what is on the WTO's agenda. 28 4 At present, with the current
war on terrorism, and with note that the current administration's
skepticism of international institutions, it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that it, given another serious decision against the United
28 5
States, the WTO's relevance might come into question.
The fallacy implicit in a system that punishes a state for the
conduct of actors that lobby governments will continue to exist
286
Most
because it appears to be the only way to remedy the problem.
students of free trade are adamant opponents of most subsidies.
Removing the SCM from the WTO would be "disastrous
psychologically and . .. [lead] to unrestrained proliferation of trade
restrictions and destructive trade wars. ' 28 7 The domestic political
process-aided by a renewed emphasis on consultations between
countries regarding remedies-must provide a check on subsidization
if one is to exist. 28 8 The bargains that have to be struck regarding
U.S. taxation structures, Australian grants to leather manufacturers,
or Brazilian or Canadian subsidies to aircraft manufacturers belong
in the hands of those respective governments particularly because
they cannot be addressed by an international body at any other level.
Though the bodies that have tried to remedy them have not come up
with compelling explanations of their methodology, they have not
respected the sovereignty of governments, and nothing-given the
reasons for the framework under which they work-suggests that
their decision making will somehow soon improve, in time, somehow,

members of Congress from agricultural districts would currently vote to leave the
WTO); Michael Zielenziger, Trade Battle in Seattle Could Launch Damaging Trade
War, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 5, 1999 (discussing the corporate
lobbyists' trepidation at having to justify continued U.S. presence in the WTO); Patrick
Buchanan, Remarks on Isolationism (Nov. 22, 1999), in FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS
("I would leave the WTO.").
282.
See BARFIELD, supra note 91, at 7.
Lovett, supra note 241, at 415.
283.
284.
Some commentators predict that as the U.S. economy sags, the dollar
slides, and an economic slump resumes, globalization protests in the United States will
increase substantially. Lovett, supra note 283, at 417.
285.
See generally discussion supra note 281 (discussing backers of leaving the
WTO).
286.
See id. (stating that GATT equilibriums were stable because outcomes were
motivated by self-interested behavior of involved parties).
See SALVATORE, supra note 61, at 285 (discussing possible consequences of
287.
a failure of the Uruguay Round).
288.

Id.
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they must. The only alternative is that the framework outlined in the
WTO Agreements will lose its broad base of support.
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